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Abstract 
 
We assess in the laboratory the impact of promises on group decision-making. The gift-exchange 
game provides the testing ground for our experiment. When played between groups, inter-group 
cooperation and reciprocity represent a condition for efficiency in overall decision making. We find 
that promises have a significant positive effect on aggregate profits. We interpret these findings as if 
promises act as a trigger of social conformity, according to which groups adopt socially more 
desirable behavior even without face-to-face communication or discussion.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Most important decisions are taken by small groups even if their consequences affect 
individuals. Group behavior depends on a variety of factors among which group structure and 
decision procedures are widely studied in economic experiments. Laboratory studies have focused 
on the role of risk (Charness et al., 2007; Rockenbach et al., 2007; Zhang and Casari, 2012), 
decision timing (Maciejovsky et al., 2013), information processing (Fahr and Irlenbusch, 2011) 
strategic reasoning (Cason and Mui 1997; Charness et al., 2010; Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Kocher 
and Sutter, 2005; Luhan et al. 2009), coordination (Charness and Jackson, 2009; Feri et al., 2010), 
self-serving bias (Goncalo and Duguid, 2008; Kugler et al., 2007), and dynamics of decision-
making (Mason et al., 2016; Song, 2009). 
To test group decision-making in the lab, economists have largely used game theoretical 
settings to measure unambiguously if choices conform to rational behavior. Most evidence shows 
that in interactive settings aggregation into groups reinforces individuals’ inclination to act as 
selfish, in-group-oriented decision-makers (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; Charness and Sutter, 2012; 
Kugler et al., 2012). This behavior is known as the discontinuity effect (Wildschut et al., 2003) 
according to which intergroup relations tend to be more competitive than interpersonal relations.  
Evidence is less clear cut when social interaction is characterized by the presence of 
incomplete contracts as in the gift-exchange game, which allows testing how social norms of 
reciprocity can implement efficient outcomes that do not emerge in competitive equilibria (Fehr et 
al., 1993). This sequential game simulates an employment contract in a principal-agent relationship, 
in which the principal is required to choose how much to transfer to the agent. Then, the agent 
chooses a costly effort level that determines the overall return. While the most common finding for 
individuals is that subjects exhibit strong reciprocity, research on groups shows that communication 
processes, deliberation processes and group identity represent important factors in approaching 
efficiency (Ambrus et al., 2015; Brady and Wu 2010; Kocher and Sutter, 2007).  
Among the reasons inducing cooperation, the order of proposals in the gift-exchange game 
has been shown to play a significant role in affecting profits. In the standard gift exchange game, 
the principal is the first to propose the contract and the agent has to decide if to reciprocate 
(Akerlof, 1982). This sequence is not generally applicable to real world. For example, in charity and 
fundraising the introduction of promises of conditional gifts made by agents is often used to 
promote cooperation. The effect of ordering inversion with individuals has been analyzed in the 
field by Landry et al. (2012) and Carpenter (2017) and in the lab by Charness et al. (2013), which 
provide evidence that agent-first ordering increases aggregate profits. In contrast, Bracht and 
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Feltovich (2009) and Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) show that bare promises have limited 
impact on efficiency.  
To examine the effect of promises in group decision, we submit to four-member groups a 
modified version of the gift-exchange game in which agents make non-binding promises before 
principals’ decisions. To focus on promises, we adopt the unanimity rule for intra-group decisions 
and exclude any other form of formal or informal communication within or between groups. We 
also compare different procedures of collective choice to verify the robustness of intra-group 
agreement with respect to factors that are relevant in bargaining modeling (Banks and Duggan, 
2000; Miller and Vanberg, 2015; Song 2009).  
Our main finding is that promises increase significantly the gifts made by agent groups and 
trigger positive reciprocity by principal groups by increasing overall efficiency. Groups behave less 
opportunistically than rational models usually assume. We interpret these findings as if promises 
would reinforce the inclination to cooperate and to reciprocate. Our result is consistent with the 
better-than-average bias according to which intra-group interaction led to socially more desirable 
behavior.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises the background literature, 
while Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures. Results and discussion are given 
in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background Literature  
 
The gift-exchange game was proposed by Akerlof (1982) to simulate the contract between 
principals and agents. In its simple form, the game is represented by a one-to-one interaction that 
can be played single shot or iterated. In the first move, the principal is assigned an endowment and 
is required to select the amount of wage (w) to transfer to the agent. Then, the agent chooses a 
costly effort level (f) that determines the principal’s return. This model has been mostly applied to 
labour relations. Workers’ effort is indeed not completely enforceable since it is not commonly 
explicitly included as a clause in work contracts. The gift-exchange game has been also investigated 
in the area of social preferences to assess the determinants of reciprocity and fairness. Laboratory 
studies show that agents do not necessarily act as selfish decision-makers but, rather, tend to 
increase their effort levels according to the amount offered by the principal. That is, agents acting as 
second mover do not necessarily minimize their costs as predicted by rational money-maximization 
but reciprocate the gift received from the first-mover principal. 
The positive correlation between wages and effort was first reported by Fehr et al. (1993), 
whose findings support preferences for fairness in that higher transfers are reciprocated by higher 
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effort levels and consequently outcomes are more efficient than market-clearing ones. These results 
were confirmed in a variety of experiments both in the lab and in the field (Abeler et al., 2010; 
Bellemare and Shearer, 2009; Brown et al., 2004; Charness and Kuhn, 2010; Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr 
et al., 2007). Other studies reported negative reciprocity which was shown to be stronger when 
hurtful choice is intentional (Kube et al., 2006; Offerman, 2002). Laboratory tests of the gift 
exchange-game were also extended to multi-agent design. In the field of labour market, Charness 
and Kuhn (2007) in a one-employer-two-workers treatment and Maximiano et al. (2007) in a one-
employer-four-workers treatment found very similar results to the bilateral gift-exchange game.  
However, less attention has been paid to situations in which both roles are played by groups 
and provided evidence is far from being conclusive. Kocher and Sutter (2007) compared individual 
and group behaviour in the gift-exchange game in order to determine if group decisions are closer 
than individuals to the standard postulate of rationality. By introducing communication within 
groups, they show that face-to-face communication induces more efficient decisions than 
individuals and groups with computer-mediated communication. Brady and Wu (2010) extend this 
result to two-person groups by testing different patterns of communication and showing that small 
changes in decision-making procedures have significant impact on aggregate profits.  
Among the other factors affecting reciprocity in the gift-exchange game, promises are 
shown to be very effective in increasing efficiency with individuals by Charness et al. (2013). In 
particular, wages proposed by workers are higher than those proposed by principals, although when 
the principal makes the first proposal the rate of acceptance by agents do not change. To explain 
these findings, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Battigalli 
and Dufwenberg (2007) postulate the presence of guilt aversion, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) 
that of preferences for consistency (“keeping one’s word”) and Vanberg (2008) for promise keeping 
per se. When applied to promises exchanged between groups, one would expect that these inners 
factors have relatively little impact. Guilt or moral values play a major role in individual decision, 
as generally any kind of moral obligation or inner pressure to reciprocate. If groups are more self-
centered than individuals in competitive games (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; Cox, 2002; Luhan et 
al. 2009), it should be more difficult to keep promises without explicit communication or forms of 
group identity reinforcing the tendency to focus on aggregate efficiency (Charness et al., 2007). 
This effect is also consistent with the responsibility-alleviation argument (Charness, 2000; Charness 
and Jackson, 2009), according to which the shift of responsibility to an external authority dampens 
impulses towards moral sentiments such as honesty or loyalty and leads to exhibit a lower degree of 
reciprocity. 
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On the other hand, the procedure of collective choice may affect group decision-making, 
even with anonymous settings in which social influence acts through spontaneous mechanisms 
known under the heading of conformity and herding. Group members tend to conform to the group 
to which they belong or because they prefer it (Bernheim and Exley, 2015) or believe that others 
have better knowledge as for informational cascades (Anderson and Holt, 1997; Bikhchandani et 
al., 1992). In this light, promises may act as a trigger of social conformity. Being part of a group 
reinforce the strength of a promise because members are motivated to perceive themselves as more 
cooperative than the average tendency. This bias, commonly known as “better-than-average”, 
motivate the inclination to self-evaluate by comparing ourselves to others and it was shown to 
impact collective decisions in the dictator game by Cason and Mui (1997), in which intra-group 
interaction led to higher reciprocity and socially more desirable behavior. In the gift-exchange game 
the tendency to cooperate in presence of promises may be motivated by similar psychological 
mechanisms. 
The present study was undertaken to test these contradictory views. To focus on the impact 
of promises we introduced in our design simple procedures of group decisions. Firstly, groups make 
only unanimous decisions, which are expected to promote a more careful examination of the 
decision to be taken than alternative voting rules (Miller, 1989). Secondly, we analyze only two 
procedures of intragroup choice. In the baseline treatment, all members are asked to submit their 
own choice, while in the proposer treatment, which is a modified version of the Baron and Ferejohn 
bargaining game (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; Miller and Vanberg, 2015), one group member, 
casually chosen, act as proposer and the other members are asked to vote his proposal. The 
comparison between the two treatments is expected to highlight the specific mechanisms behind 
conformity, which is supposed to play a greater role with the presence of a proposer. To our 
knowledge, there is no laboratory evidence that analyses this effect among groups without 
mechanisms of legal enforcement or intra-group communication and this is the distinctive feature of 
this paper. 
 
3. Experimental design  
 
In our experiment, subjects play a version of Kocher and Sutter’s (2007) one-shot gift-
exchange game divided in two groups acting as principal and agent with slight modifications. The 
main objective is to assess the impact of promises on group decisions. Since groups with more than 
three members have been found to perform better on economic decision-making (e.g., beauty-
contest game; see Sutter 2005), we decided to analyse four-person groups to emphasize the effect of 
collective decision-making procedure.  
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At the beginning of each session, participants are randomly assigned to one group and 
groups are randomly matched into pairs. Subjects’ identities as well as their decisions remain totally 
anonymous. 
The game is played in two periods. In the first period, the principal group is assigned an 
endowment of 480 experimental points and it is required to select the amount w ∈ [30; 300], in 
steps of 30 units, to transfer to the agent group. This implies that only the values 30, 60, 90, 120, 
150, 180, 210, 240, 270 and 300 are feasible. In the second period, the agent group is informed 
about the transfer of the principal group and chooses a costly effort level f ∈ [0.1; 1] to be 
determined in steps of 0.1 (only values 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1.0 are feasible).  
The value of f determines agent group’s costs according to the cost function c(f) shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Factor f and cost c(f) for the agent group  
F 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
c(f) 0 3 6 12 18 24 30 36 45 54 
Groups’ final earnings are determined as follows: 
Principal Group = [(E – w) f] 
Agent Group = [w – c (f)] 
Earnings are divided equally among group members and converted to euros for individual 
payments just after the experiment.  
To examine the effect of promises and decision procedures, we conduct four treatments: 
baseline (B), proposer (P), baseline promise (BP) and proposer promise (PP). 
In the baseline treatment (B), each member of the principal group submits a proposal for the 
transfer w. Collected proposals are communicated to the other group members. Then, the four 
proposals are separately and randomly voted by all members. If one of the four individual submitted 
proposals is unanimously accepted, it is the transfer w chosen by the principal group. If there is no 
consensus after the fifth round, the experiment ends and all the participants receive only the show-
up fee. The chosen transfer is communicated to the agent group that chooses with the same 
procedure the effort level f, which is communicated to the principal group and the game ends.  
In the proposer treatment (P), the computer randomly selects a proposer among the four 
members of the principal group, who submits a proposal for transfer w. The proposer’s offer is 
separately and randomly voted by the other three members. If the submitted proposals is 
unanimously accepted, it is the transfer chosen by the principal group. In case that there is no 
consensus after the fifth round, the experiment ends and all the participants receive only the show-
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up fee. The chosen transfer is communicated to the agent group that chooses with the same decision 
procedure with the proposer the effort level f, which is communicated to the principal group and the 
game ends. 
In the baseline promise (BP) and in the proposer promise (PP) treatments, the agent group is 
allowed to promise an effort level f before the principal group chooses the transfer w. After the 
principal group has chosen the transfer w, the effort level f, which can be equal or different from the 
promised one, is chosen by the agent group and the game ends. The intra-group decision procedures 
in the two promise treatments are, respectively, the same of the baseline (B) and the proposer (P) 
treatments. 
In all treatments, interaction within groups is restricted. Subjects are only allowed to vote 
the transfer/effort proposals following a computerized random order, without any form of direct or 
indirect communication. At the beginning of the experiment, participants received a written copy of 
the instructions and they are asked to follow along as the instructions are read aloud. No reference is 
provided to the potential strategies for the gift-exchange game. Finally, in order to avoid 
reputational effects, we underline the fact that each group takes only one decision in this experiment 
and that there was no further decision or repetition. Total earnings from the experiment and show-
up fees are paid privately in cash right after the end of the experiment.  
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
Sessions were conducted at the LabSi Laboratory of the University of Siena between 
February 2017 and February 2018. Participants were recruited with the software HROOT (Hamburg 
Registration and Organization Online Tool) (Bock et al., 2014) and all sessions were computerized 
by using z-Tree software (Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments) (Fischbacher, 
2007). All participants provided consent prior to the start of the experiment and participated in only 
one session, treatment and role. None of the subjects participated in similar experiments before.  
A total of 256 undergraduate students (57% females; median age: 23.14, SD: 3.65) took part 
in the study (64 subjects for each of the four treatment). Each session lasted about half an hour and 
each subject earned on average about €7.5, with one experimental point being equivalent to €0.10 
and a show-up fee of €5.  
Results are analysed using Ri386 3.3.3, developed by the R Foundation for Statistical 
Computing (R Core Team, 2017). Differences are tested for statistical significance by using a 
Wilcoxon two-sample test for unpaired observations.  
Data comprises 8 experimental sessions for each treatment. Table 2 summarizes the main 
descriptive results for transfer (w) and effort level (f) by treatment. 
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Table 2. Transfer w and effort f by treatment 
Treatment N. of Subjects Transfer w Effort Level f 
  Mean std.dev Mean std.dev 
Baseline (B) 64 56 25 0.11 0.04 
Proposer (P) 64 113 81 0.16 0.09 
Baseline Promise (BP) 64 124 49 0.35 0.19 
Proposer Promise (PP) 64 139 36 0.46 0.28 
Total 256 108 59 0.27 0.22 
 
The first result is that promises increase both f and w. When the agent group is allowed to 
promise an effort level before the principal group’s choice (BP and PP treatments), we observe 
significantly higher effort levels f than B and P treatments (p <. 01 and p < .05, respectively). Also 
transfers w increases with promises, though only comparison between BP and B treatments is 
statistically significant (p <. 05). 
Table 2 also shows that the presence of proposers increases both transfers and efforts in both 
treatments, though differences are not statistically significant either for B vs. P (p = .24 for f and p = 
.21 for w) or for BP vs. PP (p = .49 for f, and p = .71 for w).  
However, the positive impact of the proposer is corroborated by the analysis of the 
difference between the chosen effort level f and the promised one. Agent groups choose effort 
levels nearer to the promised ones in PP than in BP, with the distance between the two statistically 
significant (p < .05) (Table 3 and Figure 1). As tabulated, the promised f is higher in BP than PP 
which is exactly the opposite of the final effort level f. This additional result suggests that the 
difference between chosen and promised efforts is reduced by the presence of the proposer, but only 
for chosen f. In other words, when effort levels remain at promise level, the effect of the proposer is 
reduced. As a result, possibly social conformity effects may arise from final decisions and 
particularly when the group has already interacted in some way. This is in line with the idea that 
belonging to groups increases cooperation and reciprocity. 
 
Table 3. Actual versus promised effort levels by treatment 
Treatment Chosen f 
mean(sd) 
Promised f 
mean(sd) 
Baseline Promise (BP) 0.35 (0.19) 0.60 (0.19) 
Proposer Promise (PP) 0.46 (0.28) 0.56 (0.16) 
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Figure 1. Actual versus promised effort levels by treatment 
The joint effect of promises and proposer is the key factor increasing overall efficiency as 
shown by the analysis of the level of reciprocity, which is greater when higher levels of w are 
associated with higher levels of f. Figure 2 shows that principal groups reciprocates promises and 
reciprocity is higher for both promise (BP and PP) than no-promise (B and P, respectively) 
treatments for each transfer w jointly available. This increase is particularly evident when a 
proposer is present with or without promises (B vs. P and BP vs. PP).  
 
 
Figure 2. Association between transfers w (absolute values) and effort levels f (mean) by treatment 
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Average earnings are greater for BP than for B (and the difference is significant for both 
groups, p <.05,) and for PP than for P (that is significant only for the principal group, p < .1) (Table 
4).  
 
Table 4. Earnings by treatment 
Treatment 
N. of 
Subjects 
Principal Group Earnings Agent Group Earnings  
  Mean std.dev Mean std.dev 
Baseline (B) 64 12.00 4.28 13.97 6.38 
Proposer (P) 64 15.19 9.70 27.66 20.46 
Baseline Promise (BP) 64 32.06 19.45 28.31 13.46 
Proposer Promise (PP) 64 40.69 27.01 30.38 11.55 
Total 256 24.98 20.50 25.08 14.77 
 
Across treatments, procedure of choice also affects the speed of agreement. The number of 
rounds needed to reach unanimity are increasing in treatments with promises and proposers for both 
effort levels and transfers (Table 5) to confirm that subjects carefully examine decisions.  
 
Table 5. Number of rounds to reach unanimous agreement by treatment 
 Round of unanimous agreement for 
transfer w 
Round of unanimous agreement for 
effort f 
 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Baseline (B) 3 4 1 0 0 7 1 0 0 0 
Proposer (P) 2 1 1 4 0 6 1 0 1 0 
Baseline Promise (BP) 3 3 0 2 0 3 3 0 2 0 
Proposer Promise (PP) 1 2 2 0 3 2 3 0 1 2 
 
The impact of proposers is even more evident in the agents intra-group dynamics. The 
proposed transfers are greater with the proposer both in the first and in the last round (Table 6). The 
same applies for efforts, except for the comparison between B versus P, in both rounds, and BP 
versus PP, in the first round.  
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Table 6. Round proposals in first and last rounds by treatment  
Treatment First round Last Round 
 Transfer w 
mean(sd) 
Effort f 
mean(sd) 
Transfer w 
mean(sd) 
Effort f 
mean(sd) 
Baseline (B) 86 (59) 0.22 (0.19) 83 (54) 0.22 (0.18) 
Proposer (P) 128 (80) 0.14 (0.07) 113 (81) 0.16 (0.09) 
Baseline Promise (BP) 132 (77) 0.57 (0.26) 132 (64) 0.39 (0.26) 
Proposer Promise (PP) 169 (48) 0.53 (0.14) 139 (36) 0.56 (0.16) 
 
The presence of proposers causes the other group members to agree both on effort levels and 
on transfers, as if it would trigger a sort of social influence according to which individuals tend to 
conform to the proposed offer. 
To summarize, our main result is that promises reinforce the tendency to cooperate by both 
types of groups involved in the game. Promises increase significantly the gifts made by agent 
groups and trigger positive reciprocity by principal groups by enhancing overall efficiency. In our 
experiment, which is characterized by incomplete contracts, groups behave less opportunistically 
than rational models usually assume and social interaction lead to cooperative behavior. This 
finding is made evident by the comparison between treatments although it is more relevant in the 
baseline treatment. Promises per se act as a powerful tool to prevent group members to behave too 
selfishly and enhance their tendency to cooperate.  
The other distinctive feature of our design, the introduction of the proposer, markedly 
increases both w and f and makes promised and chosen effort nearer, even if the high volatility in 
the P treatment affects negatively statistical significance. Actually, proposers act as catalyzers for 
other group members that chooses higher values of w and f, which is supportive of the effect of 
conformity on other group members. This pattern of interaction creates a tendency to cooperate and 
to reciprocate that is typical of processes of social comparison. Once triggered by the proposer, 
promises causes other individuals to adhere to social norms of cooperation and creates a virtuous 
effect that reinforces the tendency to increase aggregate efficiency, as it also corroborated by the 
higher level of reciprocity in PP treatments. 
These results raise the question why groups are able to take advantage of promises to behave 
so efficiently. Charness and Sutter’s (2012) survey of group decision-making singles out three 
factors as explanations for groups outperforming individuals. Groups would be better in a) seeking 
answers by using multiple brains, b) putting in other people’s shoes, and c) behaving less 
behaviorally and focusing just on payoffs. In our scenario, all these factors do not play a prominent 
role because group decisions are taken independently and without interaction, discussion is not 
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allowed and there is not any form of group identity. Moreover, factors inducing promise keeping in 
individual interaction, such as guilt aversion or mere preference for promise-keeping, does not 
directly apply to collective decisions. What is reinforced by groups belonging is the consensus-
making mechanism (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; Song, 2009) through which group members reach 
a common decision. In our case, the unanimity rule facilitates social influence among group 
members and make people motivated to perceive themselves as more favourable than what they 
believe to be the average tendency. As postulated by Social Comparison Theory (Cason and Mui, 
1997), intra-group interaction leads to higher reciprocity and socially more desirable behavior. 
Being engaged in a group decision process makes them to choose more cooperatively even without 
face-to-face communication or discussion.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Since now, experimental literature on group decisions has mostly addressed the research 
question if decision made by groups differ systematically from the decisions of individuals who 
include them. The most common result is that groups behave more rationally but also more selfishly 
than individuals. Our experiment was intended to analyse how promises without explicit interaction 
or communication affects group decisions. To provide evidence on this issue we test if promises 
make group decisions more or less efficient in the gift-exchange game in which acting as strictly 
maximizing decision-makers implies sub-optimal outcomes. We find that groups decisions lead to 
higher social welfare when agent groups can make promises before playing the game, because they 
increase agents’ effort and principals’ reciprocity and consequently aggregate profits. The other 
element to affect efficiency is the decision procedure, which is a version of the Baron-Ferejohn 
bargaining model, in which the proposer makes the first promise and the other group members 
decide unanimously if to accept it or not. The combination of promise and proposer reinforces the 
inclination to cooperate and to reciprocate.  
Our experiment has some limitations and possible extensions. Setting a maximum number of 
rounds is a termination rule that can have a significant effect on players' behavior, which could be 
induced to adhere to group decisions for selfish reasons. Another limitation can derive from the 
even number of group members, that are more likely to reach an agreement the groups with odd 
members (Luhan et al. 2009). Thus, a natural extension is to study the effect of alternative decision 
rule and different group sizes. It can also be worthwhile to test if there is difference from the field. 
As discussed by Gneezy and List (2006), positive reciprocity effects detected in lab experiments 
can wear off very quickly in the field. For example, Kube et al. (2006) generate longer-term effects 
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of reciprocity in the field, especially for negative reciprocity. Finally, we expect that the 
introduction of face-to-face interaction increases group identity and make our findings more robust. 
We believe that the analysis of the effects of different communication patterns on groups is an 
important path for future research in order to improve our understanding of groups decision-
making. 
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Appendix. Sample experimental instructions (translated from Italian) – PP treatment  
 
Instructions Proposer Promise (PP) treatment 
 
Welcome at the experiment and thank you for your participation 
Please do not talk to other participants in the experiment from now on 
 
You are about to participate in an experimental study on decision-making. You will earn a show-up 
fee of 5 Euros just for having participated. Additionally, during the experiment, you can earn a sum 
of money, whose exact amount depends on the decisions you will make during the experiment. 
Your total earnings from the experiment and the show-up fee will be paid to you privately and 
confidentially in cash right after the end of the experiment. 
 
Types of participants 
You will be randomly assigned to a group type (A or B) and pairs of A and B groups will be formed 
randomly as well. Each group will be composed by four members. You will not learn during the 
experiment nor afterwards, which participant you are paired with. Your identity as well as your 
decisions will remain completely anonymous.  
 
Initial endowment 
Each A group member receives an initial endowment of 480 experimental points. B group members 
do not receive an initial endowment.  
 
Phases of the experiment 
The experiment consists of three phases. In Phase 1, group B takes a decision, whereas, in Phase 2, 
group A takes a decision. Finally, in Phase 3, group B takes a second decision which can be the 
same or different than its decision in Phase 1. As a result, group A takes only one decision, whereas 
group B takes two decisions. After this, there will be no further decision or repetition. 
 
Phase 1: Group B chooses a factor 
For each group B, the computer randomly selects a proposer among the four members of the group. 
The proposer submits a factor f. The factor f must come from the range 0.1 to 1.0 and can only be 
determined in steps of 0.1. This means that only the values 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
and 1.0 are feasible. The factor f is important for the final earning of group A. At the same time, it 
causes a cost c(f) for group B. As displayed in Table 1, the higher the chosen factor, the higher the 
costs for group B. 
 
Table 1. Factor f and cost c(f) for group B 
f 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  1 
c(f) 0 3 6 12 18 24 30 36 45 54 
 
The proposer’s factor f is communicated to the other group B members. Then, the proposal is 
separately and randomly voted by the other three members. If the submitted proposer’s factor is 
unanimously accepted, that proposal is the factor f chosen by group B and the first phase is 
completed; otherwise, there will be a second round. In the second round, the proposer submits 
another proposal for factor f (the proposal can be the same as the previous round). Again, the 
submitted proposer’s factor is separately and randomly voted by the other three members. If the 
submitted proposer’s factor is unanimously accepted, the first phase is completed; otherwise, there 
will be a third round. Group members have up to five rounds to reach unanimity on their proposer’s 
factor. In case that there is no consensus on group B factor after the fifth round, the experiment ends 
and the participants only receive the show-up fee. 
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The factor f, which is selected in this phase, can be the same or different than group B decision in 
phase 1. 
 
Phase 2: Group A chooses a transfer 
Group A is informed about the factor f selected by their paired group B in phase 1 (this factor f can 
be the same or different than group B decision in phase 3). Then, for each group A, the computer 
randomly selects a proposer among the four members of the group. The proposer submits a transfer 
w. This transfer determines how many experimental points of the initial endowment of group A is 
transferred to group B after phase 2. The transfer chosen by group A must be between 30 and 300 
and can only be determined in steps of 10. This means that only the values 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 
180, 210, 240, 270 and 300 are feasible. 
The proposer’s transfer w is communicated to the other group A members. Then, the proposal is 
separately and randomly voted by the other three members. If the submitted proposer’s transfer is 
unanimously accepted, group B receives that selected transfer w and the second phase is completed; 
otherwise, there will be a second round. In the second round, the proposer submits another proposal 
for transfer w (the proposal can be the same as the previous round). Again, the proposer’s transfer w 
is separately and randomly voted by the other three members. If the submitted proposer’s transfer is 
unanimously accepted, the second phase is completed; otherwise, there will be a third round. Group 
members have up to five rounds to reach unanimity on their proposer’s transfer. In case that there is 
no consensus on group A transfer after the fifth round, the experiment ends and the participants 
only receive the show-up fee. 
 
Phase 3: Group B chooses a factor 
Group B is informed about the transfer w selected by their paired group A in phase 2. Then, group 
B chooses a factor f, which can be the same or different than its decision in phase 1. Again, the 
factor f must come from the range 0.1 to 1.0 and can only be determined in steps of 0.1. This means 
that only the values 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1.0 are feasible. The factor f is 
important for the final earning of group A. At the same time, it causes a cost c(f) for group B. As 
displayed in Table 1 (above), the higher the chosen factor, the higher the costs for group B. 
 
 
For each group B, the computer randomly selects a proposer among the four members of the group. 
The proposer submits a factor f, which can be the same or different than group B decision in phase 
1. The proposer’s factor f is communicated to the other group B members. Then, the proposal is 
separately and randomly voted by the other three members. If the submitted proposer’s factor is 
unanimously accepted, that proposal is the factor f chosen by group B and the third phase is 
completed; otherwise, there will be a second round. In the second round, the proposer submits 
another proposal for factor f (the proposal can be the same as the previous round). Again, the 
submitted proposer’s factor is separately and randomly voted by the other three members. If the 
submitted proposer’s factor is unanimously accepted, the third phase is completed; otherwise, there 
will be a third round. Group members have up to five rounds to reach unanimity on their proposer’s 
factor. In case that there is no consensus on group B factor after the fifth round, the experiment ends 
and the participants only receive the show-up fee. 
 
Results and earnings 
The results in experimental points after the two phases will be calculated according to the following 
rules: 
- for the result of group A, its initial endowment (480 experimental points), the chosen transfer w 
and the factor f that is chosen in phase 3 by group B are relevant. To arrive at the resulting 
experimental points, the difference between the initial endowment and the transfer has to be 
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multiplied by the factor chosen in phase 3. The experimental points will be then equally divided 
among the four group members. Mathematically, 
 
Result for each group A member in experimental points = (480 – w) * f 
                                    4 
 
- for the result of group B, the transfer from group A and the cost of the chosen factor f are relevant. 
To arrive at the resulting experimental points, one has to calculate the difference between the 
transfer w and the costs c(f). The experimental points will be then equally divided among the four 
group members. Mathematically, 
 
Result for each group B member in experimental points = w – c(f) 
                                    4 
 
The result in experimental points will be converted to Euros according to the following conversion 
rate: 
 
1 experimental point = 0.10 Eurocents 
 
Total earnings of every participant consist of the results converted to Euros and the show-up fee. 
 
Summary 
Group B proposer submits in phase 1 a factor f between 0.1 and 1.0. Each factor is associated with a 
cost c(f) (Table 1). The submitted proposer’s factor f is separately and randomly voted by the other 
three members. Group members have up to five rounds to reach unanimity on their proposer’s 
factor. If one of the submitted proposer’s factor is unanimously accepted, that proposal is the factor 
f chosen by group B and the first phase is completed. 
Group A proposer submits in phase 2 a transfer between 30 and 300. The submitted proposer’s 
transfer w is separately and randomly voted by the other three members. Group members have up to 
five rounds to reach unanimity on their proposer’s transfer. If one of the submitted proposer’s 
transfer is unanimously accepted, group B receives that selected transfer w and the second phase is 
completed. 
Group B proposer submits in phase 3 a factor f between 0.1 and 1.0. The factor f can be the same or 
different than group B decision in phase 1. Each factor is associated with a cost c(f) (Table 1). The 
submitted proposer’s factor f is separately and randomly voted by the other three members. Group 
members have up to five rounds to reach unanimity on their proposer’s factor. If one of the 
submitted proposer’s factor is unanimously accepted, that proposal is the factor f chosen by group B 
and the third phase is completed. 
The result of group A depends on the chosen transfer w and the factor f that is determined by group 
B in phase 3. The result of group B depends on the transfer w from group A and the cost of the 
chosen factor f in phase 3. The group result in experimental points will divided equally among the 
four group members and it will be converted to Euros at the end of the experiment. 
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